Bacon: Let me ask Lee then asking another question—what would your three be? PR is one, and then are there two others, or is PR just the thing we need to focus on right now?
Drutman: I would say PR plus fusion voting for the single-winner offices. Now, fusion voting is where multiple parties can endorse the same candidate. New York has had it for a long time. In the 2024 presidential election, you could vote for Kamala Harris on the Democratic line or on the Working Families Party line. And the Working Families Party is a vibrant third party in New York.
Mostly they endorse the Democrats, but they organize, they do the things that a party is supposed to do. And actually, we just put out a great paper at New America on the Working Families Party as an associational party, by Tabatha Abu El-Haj, who’s a great election law scholar of parties. And they’re doing the things that parties should do.
Bacon: Let me drill down. What you mean is: for Senate, governor, president—things where you can only elect one person—you should be able to choose the party by which you’re voting for the person, which again communicates there’s a difference between a progressive Democrat and a moderate one, even if they’re both voting for Harris, right?
Drutman: Exactly. So you say, I want Harris to know that progressives support her, and 20 percent of her share is coming from progressives. And in a lot of presidential PR systems, what you effectively have is pre-electoral coalitions—parties come together to agree on the same presidential candidate, and they often signal the coalition that they would like to have.
I think this is a way to do that—it’s a way to keep the smaller parties active in the single-winner election. So I think that combination is actually really important. If you just do multi-party elections for the House and then not for the Senate, you lose some of the benefits of multipartyism. And having it for the president would be great.
I agree with Mark—we should think about ways to deal with the Supreme Court. Some of it could just be limiting what the Supreme Court is going to rule on and creating supermajority standards for overruling legislation. An idea I like is judicial sortition—that all of the associate justices get randomly selected to be a nine-member, or maybe it should be a 15-member, court each term.
So you don’t know what the court is going to look like, so you don’t bring litigation. And then each court selects the docket for future courts, so they don’t know what the court is going to look like. I think that would create an element of randomness that would stop some of the litigation and would bring a diversity of views to each term.
I think the disproportionality of the Senate is a big issue. That’s a harder thing to deal with. You can add some states if you want to play political hardball. Think about ways to maybe make the Senate a little less powerful. Again, Germany did something interesting—they had basically a deal where their upper chamber, the [Bundesrat], had fewer things in its jurisdiction, in exchange for giving the states in Germany—Germany is also a federal system—a little bit more autonomy.
I think we could think about some way to clarify some roles of federalism by giving states more autonomy on certain, particularly fiscal, issues and maybe limit some of the role of the Senate. Ideally, the Senate maybe should just do foreign policy, mostly. But that, again, is a big thing.
I do think we need to tackle campaign finance, and I think it should be public funding for political parties in a multi-party system.
I think we’re at a moment—and I’ve been hearing this from a lot of different people—after Callais, I think a lot of people realize that this is really a moment for a new reconstruction of American democracy. The old system is dead. It’s broken down, and everything’s on fire. But at some point there will be a clear landscape to build something new. And it could come as early as 2029. This is really a moment for a wide scoping of: what is the promise of American democracy, and how do we make that real?
Copelovitch: Definitely. It feels like something has shifted—that we’re having this conversation, and people are not saying, Oh, you’re extreme outliers to be considering these things anymore. It feels very different than, say, 2020 or 2021 where we are now.
Bacon: So now we’ve got half an hour in. I’m glad we laid out these solutions. Now I get to the part I think about the most, which is: how do we get these—these are big ideas, changing how Congress works, changing how the presidency works.
My inclination is that a Democratic Party trifecta is more likely to do these things than a Republican trifecta, as we can discuss. But I think that’s probably the best chance we have to do this stuff—in 2029, if the Democrats control the Senate, the House, and the presidency, there’s some chance they might try some of this big stuff you guys are talking about.
But to get there, we’re about to have a national presidential campaign, a Democratic primary, where 15, 20 people might run. This could be the time for a big national conversation about big ideas—but maybe it’s not. So I want to ask, starting with Mark and then going to Lee: do we want Pete Buttigieg or Kamala Harris or Josh Shapiro or Andy Beshear or anybody else—do we want them to talk about these kinds of reforms on the campaign trail in the next year?
The positive would be obviously: running for president is about talking about ideas and what you do as president, so of course they need to talk about this. The other argument would be: one, having the Democratic candidates talk about these ideas might polarize them, make them more “political” and partisan, and might make Republicans and independents even more resistant to them.
And two, it might be that voters don’t care about these ideas—because we always hear voters care about the economy—so a candidate running on democracy or these reform ideas is asking to lose. And so we might want to hope the person runs on affordability and then does these reforms in 2029. Talk about that—do you want the candidates out there discussing these kinds of issues next year?
Copelovitch: I do, and I think it’s essential. The big cleavage in the Democratic Party right now is this—and you can think about it as fight or not, or you can think about it as kitchen-table issues versus democracy.
But look, the way I think about it is: I’m old enough to remember the George W. Bush administration, and then Obama winning, and then Trump getting elected, and then Biden. And the way I think about it is we’ve run the experiment twice—that the Republican Party is going to moderate, and we’re going to get through these problems. I don’t think it’s polarization—I think one party has become a far-right party. And we’re going to get through these problems by the Democrats governing well and fixing the economy?
Obama spends all his political capital on healthcare—hugely important issue, but there was nothing left in terms of political capital on any institutional reform. Biden spends all his political capital on fixing the economy. Doesn’t get credit for it—fixed the economy better than any other country in the world in the wake of COVID. No political capital or interest in doing the institutional reform.
So for me, it’s: we know the outcome, which is you don’t get rewarded for just governing well and focusing on affordability or kitchen-table issues. And meanwhile, the Republican Party has gone further and further right. Whatever overlap we still had between the two parties clearly no longer exists anymore. You can see that with Callais, you can see that with everything else going on with Trump.
And I also think, in standard American politics, you basically have time before the midterms with the trifecta to do one thing and do it well. So if the Democrats don’t do it right away—and it’s not ready to go, and they haven’t laid the groundwork on the campaign trail for this is why the institutions are broken, and here are the big reforms—I also think all of the policy issues that people care about follow from fixing the institutions. And I don’t know how to convey that to people—I try to do that as a teacher and political scientist.
But if we had multi-party democracy and we had either a Clinton-Romney coalition, or a sort of center-left multi-party coalition that looked like the Greens and Social Democrats in Germany or something like that, you would get the policies on abortion and climate and funding education—pick your issue that you think is important.
Basically, the policies that Bernie Sanders supports are closer to what 70 percent of Americans want than the policies that Donald Trump supports, and we have institutions that don’t reflect that. So if you fix the institutions, people are going to get the policies that they want. If you keep trying to ram the policies through the current anti-majoritarian, anti-democratic institutions, the Democrats will fail, and then people will punish them electorally again.
Bacon: Let me follow up and push you a little bit here. Cory Booker is literally already running on exempting a large number of people from paying taxes. Chris Van Hollen is doing a similar plan. I assume JD Vance will have a plan like that too.
So Andy Beshear comes in and talks to us, and he says—and Mark, you say to him—Andy Beshear says, These guys are running on reducing taxes drastically for human beings in America, putting money in their pockets, and you want me to run on proportional representation. Are you asking me to lose? How is that going to be a viable plan? Talk about that.
Copelovitch: Look, I’m not a politician, so I don’t know how you sell it. But the problem with the Beshear view or the Booker view is it reminds me of the first Democratic primary debate in 2020. If you go back and remember that, everybody went down the line and talked about their perfect universal healthcare plan that they were going to pass, with no discussion of the fact that they were all dead on arrival in the Senate—even if the Democrats controlled the Senate.
So Cory Booker and Chris Van Hollen, and maybe Andy Beshear, are going to promise people a European social-democratic welfare state, and also promise that half of the households in the country are never going to pay income tax. And also tell people that the debt is too high, because we’re now at 100 percent debt to GDP. And I could give you my international political economy argument of why that’s irrelevant, but I won’t now.
But you’re actually setting yourself up as Democrats for a recipe for failure and a political backlash, because you can’t get these policies through the institutions. And if you could, we can’t pay for them. And everybody’s then going to be upset that you promised them the moon and you can’t deliver.
So I don’t know how to sell the institutions, but all it does is set the Democrats up for further electoral disappointment down the line—either we can’t get the stuff done, or people say we can’t afford it.
And I think Obama and Biden made this mistake—the Bush tax cuts can be rolled back, but only for people who make more than $400,000 or $250,000, and—
Bacon: I didn’t mean to bring us into the tax part. That was not the question. The question was the proposed—I agree, those tax plans are not great. Lee, but I think—
Copelovitch: It fits in. Which is: it’s not just can we get the policies through the institutions, it’s also that all the things that are kitchen-table issues that we say we want to do something about—you have to convince Americans that we’re going to be able to pay for them. So I do think it’s a double whammy.
Bacon: Lee, talk about my question—do you want to hear the candidates talk about these kinds of reforms? Should they be talking about these kinds of reforms on the trail next year?
Drutman: Yes, but they should talk about them as part of a story. Politics is about storytelling. It’s not about a bullet point of “what I’m going to do for you.” Here’s my policy on this, here’s my policy on this. Nobody cares about your policy plans.
People didn’t get excited about Barack Obama because of healthcare policies. They got excited about Barack Obama because of who he was and the story he told about America. It was a story of uplift, it was a story of hope, it was a story of change. These are the universal themes of successful political campaigns—you tell a story.
It’s classic storytelling, right? We’re in the middle of the story. This is the point at which all hope feels lost, and now here’s the story of uplift. The story of uplift is: the promise of American democracy is great. We have fallen down on that. It has been corrupted by evil Trump people, by greedy corporations, tech oligarchs, by corrupt politicians. When I become president, we’re going to end the gerrymandering wars. We’re going to make American democracy responsive to its promise. We’re going to give people a reason to vote. We’re going to make elections matter. We’re going to make your voice matter. And then the list of policy solutions fits into that story.
But I really am so confused by this view that has taken over a lot of smart folks in Democratic politics, which is, Oh, we’re just going to have a checklist of poll-tested policy positions that don’t fit as part of a story. What is the story of we’re going to give this tax cut to this group that they’re not going to notice? The—like the Biden—Oh, we’re going to do all these programs.
Bacon:. Let me stop you there to ask, though. There are—Zohran Mamdani told a story—but the story was about affordability. So I agree that you should not go on stage and read your policy plan. But let’s assume there are two people telling a story. One is telling a story about affordability, and one is telling a story about these reforms—about democracy. That does seem to be challenging for the person doing a story about reforms, I would say.
Copelovitch: The story about reforms, though, isn’t “here’s reforms.”
Bacon: I’m agreeing that you should not list the—let’s move past me.
Copelovitch: The story about reforms is corruption and what they—and look, if you want to go down the list of candidates, the guy who’s doing this is Ossoff. When you see Ossoff speak, it’s what Lee was saying: the system is corrupt, it doesn’t represent you.
And there are crimes being committed, and people need to be held accountable. So yeah, you need a story about the institutional reforms, but they’re not mutually exclusive.
The system is corrupt, and you can do the populism thing also about regular people getting ripped off and all the policies are bad. But—it’s not just say, Here’s why proportional representation and fusion voting are good. It’s in the context of: the things we think American democracy is supposed to represent are not being represented anymore.
Bacon: Let me follow up and ask, though. A campaign is about going to Iowa, but it’s also about talking to editorial boards, talking to people like me. Should Andy Beshear, on his website, have Here is my plan for proportional representation—or not? Because at some point, you’re going to have to release some ideas. We don’t have to talk about them on the stump, but should the ideas be out there in some way?
Copelovitch: Yes.
Drutman: Yes.
Copelovitch: And my view is yes. You said people don’t understand this and they’re not demanding it, but people don’t follow politics closely—they respond to what’s put out there. As a political scientist, my view is people don’t understand these things, but they would if politicians talked about them. It’s not—I give the average voter a lot more credit than I think a lot of politicians do.
You could talk about Supreme Court reform—Callais makes that really easy now. The gerrymandering thing—and we’re back to Jim Crow—makes all the stuff about PR much easier to talk about now. And Trump running amok on policies with war and trade makes reining in the executive—it feels a lot easier to make that case now.
And I think, yes, on your website, if you’re a politician and you’re running for president now as a Democrat, it can’t just be the checklist of policies, like Lee was saying. It also needs to be, And here’s how we’re going to fix this stuff, which is going to require changing things in ways that we as Americans have been uncomfortable with for the last 50 years.
The other thing about modern American politics is—and I don’t know how we got here—we changed our institutions all the time until about the 1950s. We added states all the time. We changed how voting happened all the time. We delegated trade authority from Congress to the president—we did all these things all the time.
And we got at some point in my lifetime as an adult into this idea that the institutions are cast in amber and we can’t change them anymore, which is the most ahistorical part of the whole American democratic experiment. We used to do this stuff all the time. We should be able to do it again.
Bacon: Yeah. Go ahead. Lee—what about the polarization thing? If having the Democratic candidates talk about here are my ideas, or if in some way it’s clear that proportional representation has become a Democratic idea, advanced by Democratic candidates—does that make it harder to convince the rest of the country that it’s a good idea for the country?
Drutman: It depends how you talk about it, to some extent. You can talk about it as this is the thing to keep Democrats in power, or this is the thing to end the gerrymandering wars. And if you say, Americans are sick and tired of the gerrymandering wars, Americans are sick and tired of the two-party system, Americans want more options—then that’s a way to sell it more universally.
And any issue that becomes prominent in American politics is going to be polarized, because we are in a hyper-polarized time. The only issues that are unpolarized are the issues that nobody talks about. There’s a secret Congress where you can do bipartisan stuff if you want to do something that nobody in The New Republic is ever going to write about—a very niche issue.
If you want to fix something on copyright for songs on streaming services—yeah, sure, you can do that, that can be bipartisan. But as soon as you talk about something like how we do elections in this country, that’s going to be partisan.
Now, there’s a way in which you can talk about this as: it is good for people who don’t feel represented by the current Republican Party, even though they’re not Democrats. You might not support this because it seems like a Democratic issue, but it could be a 60, 70 percent issue. And all Republicans in Congress vote against it because, of course, they have to.
But then it changes the rules, and some of them could actually run under this system as the type of Republican that I think they thought they were going to be when they got into politics before Trump took all the energy.
You can imagine John Thune running as a different type of Republican. You can imagine a bunch of Republicans who have lost in the last several cycles running as different types of Republicans under a system in which they can run as a center-right party. Right now, there’s one path to get elected as a Republican, and that’s kissing the Trump ring.
Copelovitch: There’s a Cheney-Kinzinger party that gets 15 percent of the vote or something like that and is part of a coalition government.
Bacon: So the last question is: let’s imagine a scenario—Democrats win the House, Democrats win the Senate, Democrats win the presidency. They can do some kind of political reform bill. Politicians don’t tend to want to take away their power, and what we are calling for in a certain sense is: the Democratic Party should win an election, win all these states, spend all this money, and then come into power and create new parties to disempower itself, functionally—to give Americans more choices, to imply that the Democratic Party is somehow not properly governing the country, and therefore we should give other parties a chance. I’m having a hard time imagining the current Democratic Party House members—I know some of these people—doing that. So is that fanciful, or do you—that would require a level of patriotism that I would love to see but I’m skeptical of. Reassure me that these people can do that.
Drutman: There’s the simple self-interested argument that you can make to Democrats, which is basically: the cost of ruling—if you win the trifecta in 2029, the cost of ruling is going to come at you hard and fast. You will lose the midterms, because every party in power loses the midterms. You can’t solve the affordability crisis with enough force and energy to actually make a difference. And people are mostly voting for Democrats in the current elections because they’re anti-MAGA, not because they are pro-Democrat. So Democrats will lose, and then the Republicans will rewrite all the maps in the census year, and things will get a lot worse. So that’s one argument.
But also—do elected Democrats want to be in this world of perpetual redistricting? Do they want to be in this world of perpetual gerrymandering? And do they think of themselves as Democrats, or would they rather think of themselves as progressives or moderates?
There are a lot of factions within the party that are warring against each other. Wouldn’t you rather, if you’re a moderate Democrat, say, Look, I’m the moderate Democrat. You want the crazy communist lefties? Go vote for them, join their party. Or the progressive Democrats say, I’m progressive. You want the corporate Democrats? Go vote for them. We’re different parties, and we can work together, but we want to empower you, the voters.
Members of Congress like being in Congress—although increasingly they don’t, even though they go. There’s going to be a lot of turnover in Congress. A lot of people are retiring. And the idea that you represent a meaningful constituency in an age of perpetual redistricting is just harder and harder to sell.
Sure, any reform takes power. But if I’m Hakeem Jeffries, the sell I’d make to him would be: Look, you preside over a coalition, and you can hold together that coalition for two years at best under the current system. You might be part of a coalition that has power longer if you allow the different pieces of the coalition to run independently. And you support a reform that Americans would be super enthusiastic for, because Americans have been screaming in every single poll. Do you want more parties? Yes—70 percent. Do you think the system needs fundamental change? 80 percent.
Copelovitch: Yeah. I’d also go back, Perry, to something Lee said before. He brought up Adam Przeworski’s—a scholar from NYU—classic definition of democracy: a system in which parties lose elections. And the thing that you’re bringing up—that we fear designing ourselves out of office—is predicated on all parties believing in losing elections, and that regular democracy is going to continue into the future.
And it feels different now. We’re in a moment where we’re watching [a return] to Jim Crow, and the Republicans are trying to tilt the playing field to the point that they might be in power—nobody’s in power forever—but basically all the time. And so it just feels to me, again, there’s a moment now where more people realize that politics-as-usual—we don’t want to consider any of these institutional reforms because that’s how politics works, as you were describing it—that’s going to be hard to change for sitting elected politicians.
But if you do think, for the party in the medium term, what would it mean for the Democrats to be in government in coalition and get the policies that the party claims it wants? It’s actually a rational calculation to think about institutional reforms, even if that means in the next election, instead of winning 52 percent of the vote, you might win 33 percent of the vote. The policies that are part of the party platform that you say you’ve been fighting for forever—you would accomplish them in a coalition government. I don’t think that’s going to appeal to every politician. But—
Drutman: But who’s the “you” in that statement? Because what is a party? It’s a label and a collectivity—but it’s a bunch of individual politicians and groups and voters who might—what, the 33 percent? It’s not that the Democratic coalition will get 33 percent. It’s that the Democratic coalition might actually get more votes, because they could actually expand if they add more parties to that coalition.
Copelovitch: This is where I think the German analogy is very good again. You could imagine the three parties that replace the Democrats might actually get more votes than the single Democratic Party—
Drutman: I’m sure they would. And they could build a supermajority coalition under certain circumstances. And again, there are a lot of these policies that are 65 percent policies. But we have a system in which a minority that is well-placed as a plurality of a plurality can get total control over our government, which is a real flaw in our system.
Copelovitch: And a nine-member super-legislature that can veto what makes it through the other two legislatures.
Bacon: And speaking of that—do we know what Samuel Alito’s views on proportional representation are? Do we know what his views are on multi-party democracy? Is it possible we pass this reform and they immediately strike it down? Lee, you’ve been studying this more—is that a possibility?
Drutman: It’s possible. I spent a lot of time advocating for proportional representation, and I will say, in the wake of the Callais decision, this is the first time that anybody has ever suggested that proportional representation would get struck down by the court. So yes, you can draw some—I don’t know what the argument would be. It’s not an argument that any election law person has ever raised. But you can’t rule out anything—
Copelovitch: I do think the sequencing thing is important, though. That’s why we were talking earlier—I think fixing the Supreme Court has to be right away. For precisely this reason: if we’re at the point of speculating that institutional reforms passed through Congress might be overruled by the Supreme Court, then we have a massive problem of separation of powers and a runaway institution.
Drutman: You have a voting rights law that was on the books for a long time, and all of a sudden that’s unconstitutional. The U.S. Congress has been regulating—using its Article I, Section 4 powers to regulate how it does elections—for the entire history of the republic. And is Congress now going to say that it doesn’t have that power anymore? And come up with some cockamamie reading of Article I, Section 4 that it only applies to such and such because such and such originalist theory thought only white men could vote—and therefore, to be truly originalist, only propertied white men over the age of 25 should vote, because that’s the true originalist view? Is that where we’re going with it? I don’t know.
I agree there are a lot of reasons to do Supreme Court reform. The court has basically disqualified itself from the role of being the Supreme Court, in my opinion—and I think the opinion of a lot of folks. And I think this is something that is a real live question among the people who will have the pen in 2029. I think presidential candidates should talk about it. I think some ideas are better than others.
But this is a moment that we’re in—these next few years—in which there’s going to be a lot of space for exploring what the reconstruction of American politics should look like. And I think it needs to be comprehensive. You get one chance to do this, and if you don’t do it right, it’s 20 years of misery.
Copelovitch: Yeah. And again, I would say, as we were talking about before, and as a political economy scholar—this is not mutually exclusive with the kitchen-table and affordability stuff.
The reason the economy is being driven into the ground and is a total mess is the runaway executive and the failure of Congress to act and the corruption. And so for me, those things go together—they’re two sides of the same coin.
Bacon: You’re both rejecting—you’re both saying my “affordability versus democracy” framing is wrong. Basically, that’s a false choice.
Copelovitch: I think that’s the debate that’s going to happen, and I think we have a sense of which candidates or potential candidates would be on which side of it. And I think it’s a false dichotomy.
Drutman: Yeah. I agree. You can talk about both. And you can link them as part of the same story—that this is the corruption of the American ideal. I just don’t know what the affordability policy story is that you would tell. I’m going to get into office and put price controls on everything?
Bacon: Cory Booker is literally saying, I will cut off your taxes if you make less than X amount of money—I forget the amount right now. But they are saying—Katie Porter, a lot of people are saying, You will not pay taxes if you’re a police officer, a teacher, a firefighter. That’s what they’re all saying. These are not great ideas—I’m just saying these are the ideas.
Drutman: And I feel like they’ve been roundly rejected by even the people who you would think would support them—even the popularism crowd has rejected these ideas for the most part.
Copelovitch: No. And this is—I think the only good thing to come out of the wildly illegal and unconstitutional DOGEing of the country and the government is it’s made people aware of what government actually does. Suzanne Mettler at Cornell has written about the submerged state—people don’t realize all the things the federal government does. And so if you’re telling people we’re going to defund the government by nobody paying income taxes, people have already started to realize what defunding and dismantling the government means in terms of public services.
So if you do think in terms of popularism or affordability—on some level, I think people are a little bit more aware of what the government does in the economy than they were a decade ago, for horrible reasons. But again, I think that factors in: yes, we would all like our taxes to be lower, but at the same time, if you’re telling me that then the government can’t afford all these things that I want, I’m not sure politically if that’s the right way to go.
Bacon: Guys, great conversation. I want to give you room—I know we’re at an hour here. If you have any final thoughts, I want to give you room to give them.
Drutman: I just want to emphasize that I think this is a real moment in which a lot of folks—not just us, but a lot of folks with real authority to do something—are really thinking big. And these conversations are really important. This is a moment in which a lot is possible, and we should really think big.
And I get frustrated when people say, Oh, this is a 30-year project, or something—because that’s just giving up on it. This is a unique moment. This is the moment in which we can do big change, because there is an appetite and hunger for it. The American people are screaming for it. Our institutions are fundamentally broken. And this is a moment when there is a demand and a necessity for some real leadership—and I’m starting to see it emerge.
Copelovitch: Yeah. I would just come back to the historical and comparative points that I was making earlier. I think it’s crucially important—and Lee is right, this is the moment—and I’m glad we’re talking about it here.
But I think, historically, as part of the project of American democracy completing Reconstruction—we’ve done this before, regularly, in previous eras. And it is a deeply American thing to keep updating our institutions, regardless of what the originalists say about what the founders intended. That’s a historical thing in American politics.
But the other—as an international relations and comparative person—is that we have a sense as Americans that we’re exceptional, that we’re the paragon of democracy, and our institutions are better than everybody else’s. And I think the thing is, as we were talking about Germany and other cases: other countries do representative democracy better than us in terms of institutions.
And we should learn the lessons of 300 years of what we know about institutional evolution of democracy. Nobody emulates and designs the U.S. Constitution in the 21st century. They look to other models. And as we’re thinking about fixing our problems, that comparative analysis—and a little bit of getting over ourselves as Americans—is important. Other countries actually do some things better. They do some things worse. But we actually need to look at those possible models of parliamentary democracy elsewhere as things that we as Americans might actually want to emulate.
Drutman: We’re the best country in the world. We should have the best political institutions.
Copelovitch: Yeah. And what the best ones are in 2026 is not what they were in 1787.
Bacon: It’s a great place to end on. Lee Drutman, Mark Copelovitch—you can find both of them on Bluesky. Very insightful political scientists. This was a great conversation. We’ll have more of these. Democracy reform is going to be a big theme for Right Now, so we’re going to have these guys back and others to talk about these kinds of issues. Guys, thanks for joining me. Great conversation. Good to see you.
Copelovitch: Thank you so much for having us. Take care.
